

LipPass: Lip Reading-based User Authentication on Smartphones Leveraging Acoustic Signals

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Increasing Security Concerns of Mobile Devices



➤ Mobile Device

- Pervasive and common
- Frequent storage medium for **sensitive information**
 - ID number, CVS code of credit cards

➤ Concern about **privacy leakage** in mobile devices

- 78% users worry about losing sensitive data on their personal devices (Symantec[1])

➤ **User Authentication**

- First guard for privacy on mobile devices
- Direct and efficient

Existing Authentication Mechanisms

➤ Password

- Most widely deployed
- But **hard to remember & vulnerable to stealing attacks**



➤ Biometric-based approaches

- Fingerprint, Face recognition, Voiceprint
- Based on physiological characteristics →
 - **Vulnerable to replay attacks**
 - **Susceptible to ambient environments (e.g., lights & noises)**



➤ To deal with the weakness,

- **Behavioral characteristic-based authentication**




Outline

- **Preliminary**
- System Design
- Evaluation
- Conclusion


Motivation

- When a user speaks
 - Lip movements
 - Different users → different lip movements
- Capturing lip movements
 - Utilizing audio devices on smartphones
 - Emitting acoustic signal by the speaker, and receiving reflected signal through the microphones
 - Lip movements → Doppler effect of acoustic signals




Doppler Effect

- An object moving (at speed v) relative to acoustic signal source brings a frequency change
 - $\Delta f = \frac{v}{c} \times f_0$, where c and f_0 are speed and frequency of acoustic signals respectively
- Audio device setting
 - $f_0 = 20\text{kHz}$, sampling rate: 44.1kHz
- Time-domain \rightarrow Frequency-domain
 - 2048-point FFT



Difference in Doppler Profiles


- When speaking the same passphrase
 - Doppler profiles of **different users** are significantly **different**
 - Doppler profiles of **the same user** are **similar**
- Doppler profiles caused by lip movements → User authentication



(a) User 1

(b) User 2

Hello



(a) User 1

(b) User 2

World

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
Overview

➤ Two Phases:

- Register & Login


➤ Four Processes:

- Passphrase Segmentation
- Deep Learning-based Feature Extraction
- Classifiers and Detectors Training
- User Identification and Spoofer Detection



Passphrase Segmentation


- A passphrase → **several words**
 - There is usually **a short interval** between two successive words
- Speaking words vs. Intervals between words
 - Speaking → **significant Doppler effect** caused by lip movements
 - Interval → **only white noises**
- **Threshold-based** approach



Deep Learning-based Feature Extraction


- From acoustic signal episode of each word
 - Extract **efficient and reliable** features
- Three-layer **autoencoder-based** Deep Neural Network
 - **Non-linear** feature extraction
 - Abstract compressed representations through **unsupervised manner**

- 1st Layer: **coarse-grained word-level**
- 2nd Layer: **fine-grained word-level** (e.g., phoneme level)
- 3rd Layer: **user-level**




Classifiers and Detectors Training

- Multi-user Classifier & Spoofer Detector Training
 - **SVM** (Support Vector Machine) & **SVDD** (Support Vector Domain Description)
- Users register to the system **sequentially**
 - Reconstruct a classifier whenever a new user registers → **significant computational complexity**
 - **Multiple binary classifiers training**
- Assume i^{th} user registers to the system
 - Train a **binary classifier** through one-versus-rest manner (i.e., i^{th} user & other $i-1$ users)
 - Train a **spoofer detector** through SVDD (i.e., i^{th} user & spoofers)




User Identification & Spoofing Detection

- Authentication under single word
 - **Binary tree-based** authentication



User Identification & Spoofer Detection (Con.)

- Authentication under multiple words
 - Strengthen robustness of authentication result
- An example (User₁ & User₂ register to the system):
 - A user speaks ‘Hello my phone’ to login
 - Three labels (i.e., U_1, U_2, U_1) can be obtained through the approach above
 - Calculate two confidences for two users (i.e., $conf_1 > conf_2$)
 - The user is identified as User₁



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Experiment Setup

- **48 volunteers** in **4 real environments** respectively
 - Volunteers: 24 males and 24 females, whose ages range in [18,52]
 - Environments: lab (bright and quiet), station (bright but noisy), dark lab (quiet but dark), pub (dark and noisy).
- **10 passphrases**:
 - Each of them contains 1-10 words
 - Each word contains >4 phonemes



Lab



Station



Dark Lab



Pub

Overall Performance

- Achieve **over 80%** accuracy in identifying registered users
- Average **90.2%** accuracy in **user authentication**
- Average **93.1%** accuracy in **spoofers detection**

U ₁	0.837	0.033	0.006	0.024	0.029	0.005	0.050	0.000	0.010	0.000	0.006
U ₂	0.020	0.857	0.024	0.030	0.031	0.000	0.010	0.006	0.013	0.006	0.003
U ₃	0.010	0.012	0.871	0.024	0.010	0.006	0.010	0.047	0.000	0.004	0.006
U ₄	0.024	0.000	0.010	0.925	0.000	0.006	0.012	0.000	0.003	0.010	0.010
U ₅	0.006	0.000	0.010	0.000	0.933	0.020	0.000	0.009	0.010	0.000	0.012
U ₆	0.020	0.006	0.000	0.010	0.010	0.930	0.000	0.018	0.000	0.000	0.006
U ₇	0.020	0.006	0.000	0.000	0.010	0.030	0.900	0.000	0.010	0.012	0.012
U ₈	0.011	0.012	0.020	0.010	0.010	0.006	0.006	0.910	0.000	0.006	0.009
U ₉	0.012	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.006	0.000	0.002	0.006	0.938	0.000	0.006
U ₁₀	0.020	0.010	0.020	0.000	0.010	0.000	0.000	0.010	0.000	0.920	0.010
Spoofers	0.016	0.010	0.012	0.006	0.010	0.000	0.003	0.006	0.000	0.006	0.931

Comparison with other Authentication System

➤ Ideal environment (Lab)

- LipPass: **95.3%** vs. Wechat: 96.1% & Alipay: 97.2% (**similar performance**)

➤ Noisy environment (Station)


- LipPass: **92.4%** vs. Wechat: 34.3%
(significantly **better than Wechat**)

➤ Dark environment (Dark Lab)

- LipPass: **94.9%** vs. Alipay: 32.9%
(significantly **better than Alipay**)


➤ Worst environment (Pub)

- LipPass: **91.7%** vs. Wechat: 21.3% & Alipay: 20.4%
(**better than other two approaches**)



Response Time

- Response time = Login Time – End Speaking Time
- CDF of response time
 - 90% of volunteers are with less than 0.8s
 - Average response time: 0.64s
- LipPass is responsive



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Conclusion

➤ Observation:

- reveal the feasibility of utilizing Doppler profiles induced by lip movements for **user authentication**

➤ Contribution:

- Propose a **lip reading-based user authentication** system
- Design a **deep learning-based method** to abstract high-level behavioral characteristics of lip movements
- Develop a **binary tree-based authentication** approach to identify each individual

➤ Evaluation: evaluate performances of *LipPass* in four real environments

- Achieve **90.2%** accuracy in **user authentication**
- Achieve **93.1%** accuracy in **spoof detection**

Thank you!

Q & A



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